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Abstract—In this paper, we consider the transmit design for
multi-input multi-output (MIMO) wiretap channel including a
malicious jammer. We first transform the system model into
the traditional three-node wiretap channel by whitening the
interference at the legitimate user. Additionally, the eavesdropper
channel state information (ECSI) may be fully or statistically
known, even unknown to the transmitter. Hence, some strategies
are proposed in terms of different levels of ECSI available to
the transmitter in our paper. For the case of unknown ECSI, a
target rate for the legitimate user is first specified. And then an
inverse water-filling algorithm is put forward to find the optimal
power allocation for each information symbol, with a stepwise
search being used to adjust the spatial dimension allocated to
artificial noise (AN) such that the target rate is achievable. As
for the case of statistical ECSI, several simulated channels are
randomly generated according to the distribution of ECSI. We
show that the ergodic secrecy capacity can be approximated
as the average secrecy capacity of these simulated channels.
Through maximizing this average secrecy capacity, we can obtain
a feasible power and spatial dimension allocation scheme by
using one dimension search. Finally, numerical results reveal the
effectiveness and computational efficiency of our algorithms.
Index Terms—Physical-layer secrecy, artificial noise, power
allocation, secrecy rate, malicious jammer, channel state infor-
mation
I. INTRODUCTION
Due to the broadcast nature of wireless medium, physical
layer security approach is playing an increasingly important
role in wireless communication recently. It can achieve sig-
nificant security performance without using secret keys whose
distribution and management may lead to security holes in
wireless systems. Wyner’s work in [1] has established the
fundamentals of physical-layer secrecy since 1970’s, in which
the positive secrecy rate is proved to be achievable in a
degraded wiretap channel; refer to [2] for a detailed overview
of physical-layer secrecy. The past several decades have
witnessed a rapid development of research on physical-layer
secrecy, especially in the multi-input multi-output (MIMO)
channels. For ease of exposition, we name the transmitter, the
legitimate receiver and the eavesdropper Alice, Bob and Eve,
respectively.
Different tactics against eavesdropper have been developed
with various levels of eavesdropper channel state information
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(ECSI) available to Alice. For the case of full ECSI, Khisti
and Wornell extended Wyner’s work to the multi-input, single-
output, multi-eavesdropper (MISOME) and multi-input, multi-
output, multi-eavesdropper (MIMOME) wiretap channel, re-
spectively [3], [4]. Furthermore, some effective transmit de-
signs are proposed to maximize the secrecy rate by adopting
alternating optimization (AO) algorithm and generalized sin-
gular value decomposition (GSVD) algorithm in [5] and [6],
respectively. For the case of unknown ECSI, Goel and Negi
first proposed the technique of artificial noise (AN) to degrade
Eve’s channel [7]. While for the case of statistical ECSI, it
is more intricate due to being less mature in comparison with
that on full CSI and unknown CSI. Several works have focused
on the statistical CSI recently. J. Li and A. P. Petropulu have
proved the optimality of beamforming in the MISOME system
where Eve’s channel may have a nonzero mean or nontrivial
covariance matrix [8], [9]. In [10], AN is taken into account in
MISOME system, and the optimal power allocation strategy
is determined by attaining the lower bound of the ergodic
secrecy capacity. Moreover, an iterative algorithm is firstly
proposed to deal with the MIMOME system with statistical
ECSI in [11]. On the other hand, the impact of malicious
jammer on the secrecy performance is another problem of
long-standing interest. Seeking for the effective tactics against
malicious jammer turns out urgent and critical in some special
networks, such as, military networks. A prevalent approach
is to model the transmitter and malicious jammer as play-
ers in a game-theoretic formulation [12]. Nevertheless, these
game-theoretic-based works seldom concentrate on the optimal
power allocation strategy for both parties. Actually, in order to
degrade Eve’s channel and guarantee Bob’s reception quality
simultaneously, the power allocation strategies turn out to be
a dilemma. To the best of our knowledge, few studies work
on the scenario for its challenges.
In this paper, we consider the transmit design for four-
node multiple-antenna wiretap channel including a malicious
jammer. We firstly show that the four-node wiretap channel can
be transformed into the traditional three-node wiretap channel
by whitening the interference at Bob. Based on the channel’s
transformation, different transmit schemes are proposed with
various levels of ECSI available at Alice. Specifically, for the
case of unknown ECSI, a novel optimization algorithm is put
forward. A target rate for Bob is first set, and an inverse water-
filling algorithm is derived to determine the optimal power
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Fig. 1. MIMO wiretap channel with a malicious jammer
allocation scheme for Alice. Meanwhile, a stepwise search
is then used to find the optimal spatial dimension allocated
to AN such that the target rate is achievable. For the case of
statistical ECSI, in view of the high computational complexity
of the scheme proposed in [11], we simulate some random
channel according to the distribution of ECSI. Then the
ergodic secrecy capacity can be approximated as the average
secrecy capacity of these simulated channels. To maximize the
average secrecy capacity, we employ one dimension search to
determine the optimal power allocation and optimal spatial
dimension allocation between the information signal and AN.
The numerical results verify the efficacy of our proposed
schemes.
Notation: Bold symbols in capital letter and small letter
denote matrices and vectors, respectively. (•)H, Tr(•), (•)−1
and |•| represent conjugate transpose, trace, inversion and
determinant of a matrix. Z+ is the set of nonnegative in-
tegers. I denotes an identity matrix and [x]+ = max(0, x).
x ∼ CN (µ,Ω) denotes that x is a complex circular Gaussian
random vector with mean µ and covariance Ω. A  0 implies
that A is a Hermitian positive semidefinite (PSD) matrix while
x  0 implies that each component of x is nonnegative.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
Consider a four-node multiple-antenna wiretap channel in-
cluding a malicious jammer, which is illustrated in Fig. 1. All
terminals are equipped with multiple antennas. We will call the
malicious jammer Jack for short. Suppose that Alice, Bob, Eve
and Jack are equipped with NA, NB , NE and NJ antennas,
respectively. It is assumed that Jack only transmits AN to
degrade Bob’s reception and no information will be shared
between Jack and Eve. The received signals at Bob and Eve
can be modeled as
yb = Hbaxa +Hbjj+ nb (1)
ye = Heaxa + ne (2)
respectively, where Hba ∈ CNB×NA and Hbj ∈ CNB×NJ
represent the MIMO channel from Alice and Jack to Bob, re-
spectively,and Hea ∈ CNE×NA represents the MIMO channel
from Alice to Eve. xa ∈ CNA is the signal transmitted by
Alice. j ∈ CNJ is the AN generated by Jack to jam Bob.
Without loss of generality, the additive noise, nb ∈ CNB and
ne ∈ CNE , are supposed as i.i.d. complex Gaussian noise
with zero mean and unit variance. Since Hbj is fixed over a
sufficiently long period of time, Bob can detect it and then
feed it back to Alice. It is reasonable to assume that Hba and
Hbj are both known to Alice, but Hea may be only fully or
statistically known, even unknown to Alice.
Suppose that Hbj is inaccessible to Jack, so it is an optimal
strategy for Jack to transmit omni-directional AN [13], i.e.,
Qj =
Pj
Nj
I (3)
where Qj is the covariance matrix of j, Pj is the total
transmission power of Jack.
In this paper, we focus on the optimization of the input co-
variance matrix design at Alice. The four-node-based secrecy
rate maximization (SRM) design can be formulated as
R∗s = max [Rb −Re]
+
s.t. Tr(Qa) ≤ P
(4)
where Rb and Re denote the achievable transmission rate
between Alice and Bob/Eve, i.e.,
Rb = ln
∣∣∣I+ (I+HbjQjHbjH)−1HbaQaHbaH
∣∣∣ (5)
Re = ln
∣∣∣I+HeaQaHeaH
∣∣∣ (6)
in which Qa
∆
= E(xax
H
a ) is the covariance matrix of xa.
Because the problem above is nonconvex, it’s generally
difficult to obtain the optimal solution. Note that when ECSI
is unknown, this problem gets further intractable to deal with.
To tackle it, we will simplify this problem by utilizing the
interference whitening in the next section.
III. EQUIVALENT SYSTEM MODEL
We define
(I+HbjQjHbj
H)
−1
= CCH (7)
for its positive semi-definition. According to the Sylvester’s
determinant theorem, that is, det(Im+AB) = det(In+BA),
for any A ∈ Cm×n and B ∈ Cn×m, Rb can thus be simplified
as
Rb = ln
∣∣∣I+ H˜baQaH˜Hba
∣∣∣ (8)
where H˜ba , CHHba is defined as the equivalent channel
matrix.
In doing this way, the four-node wiretap channel with a
jammer has been transformed into the conventional three-node
wiretap channel, which is depicted in Fig. 2. The equivalent
received signals at Bob and Eve are given in (9).
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Fig. 2. The equivalent MIMO wiretap channel
y˜b = H˜baxa + n˜b
ye = Heaxa + ne
(9)
In (9), y˜b , CHyb and n˜b , CH(Hbjj+ nb) are defined as
the equivalent received signal and white noise at Bob, n˜b ∼
CN (0, I).
IV. TRANSMIT DESIGN WITH DIFFERENT LEVELS OF ECSI
A. Unknown ECSI at Alice
In many applications, it is impractical to assume that full
ECSI is available to Alice. When the ECSI is unknown to
Alice, it is infeasible to solve the problem in (4) directly.
In [14], it has been indicated that maximizing the AN can
improve the secrecy performance as long as a desired SINR is
guaranteed to achieve. However, the scheme proposed in [14]
merely aims at single-flow data transmission, that is, only one
spatial dimension is exploited for information symbols while
the others are exploited for AN. In fact, we are able to degrade
Eve’s reception subspace with only NE spatial dimensions
being allocated to AN. Therefore, in this subsection, we put
forward another algorithm which makes effective use of spatial
dimension to further improve the secrecy performance. To be
specific, we first specify a target data rate R for Bob. Then
Ne dimensions are allocated to AN which is generated to
be orthogonal with the information symbols at Bob. Next,
a proper scheme is designed to achieve the target data rate
with the smallest possible power allocated to the information
symbols. Particularly, it should be mentioned that some target
rate may be unreachable in some cases, in such cases, the
communication is assumed to be in outage. Apparently, the
more power allocated to AN, the more degradation Eve will
encounter. But one can notice that the secrecy rate will also
decrease resulted from less power allocated to information
symbols. Hence, the power distribution ratio between informa-
tion and AN, denoted by ρ, should be determined prudently.
With AN being transmitted, the transmit signal xa can be
decomposed into the following form,
xa =Wuu+Wzz (10)
where u ∈ Cd1 is information-bearing signal intended for
Bob, z ∈ Cd2 is the AN created by Alice. The elements of z
are chosen to be i.i.d. complex Gaussian random variables.
Assume that u ∼ CN (0,Qu) and z ∼ CN (0,Qz), u
and z are assumed to be independent. Wu ∈ CNA×d1 and
Wz ∈ CNA×d2 represent the precoding matrix and the AN
shaping matrix respectively, in which d1 and d2 represent the
spatial dimension allocated for u and z. To avoid the AN
interference at Bob, (Wu,Wz) should be an orthogonal basis
of CNA .
We consider the total power budget denoted by P , and then
we arrive at
Qu=diag(P1, P2, · · · , Pd1),Tr(Qu)=ρP
Qz=
(1− ρ)P
d2
I,Tr(Qz)=(1− ρ)P
(11)
where Pi(i = 1, 2, ..., d1) denotes the power allocated to ith
information symbol. Note that the AN power is uniformly
distributed to each AN symbol, which has been proved to be
the best option for Alice in [15].
Since the ECSI is unknown, Alice is assumed to begin with
NE spatial dimension being allocated to AN to degrade Eve’s
reception. Meanwhile, more dimensions will be allocated to
information symbols if the target rate is too high to achieve. As
a result, if c is assumed to be the number of nonzero singular
value of H˜ba, Alice should choose Wu as the right singular
vectors corresponding to the min(NA−NE , c) largest singular
values of H˜ba. Here, we suppose that Alice is equipped
with more antennas than Eve, i.e., NA > NE . Wz must be
composed of the remaining NA − d1 right singular vectors of
H˜ba. Hence, we have
d1 = min(NA −NE , c)
d2 = NA − d1
(12)
Then the real data rate for Bob is given by
Rb =
d1∑
i=1
ln(1 + σ2i Pi) (13)
where {σi}d1i=1 are the d1 largest nonzero singular values of
H˜ba.
To minimize the fraction of the transmit power required to
achieve the target rate R, a power allocation minimum design
can be formulated as
min
Pi,i=1,...,d1
d1∑
i=1
Pi
s.t.
d1∑
i=1
ln(1 + σ2i Pi) = R
p , [P1, P2, ..., Pd1 ]
T  0
d1∑
i=1
Pi ≤ P
(14)
Recalling the conventional water-filling algorithm, one can
find that (14) operates in an inverse way. Hence, we name
our algorithm as an inverse water-filling algorithm.
Let Pi = e
xi−1
σ2
i
, for i = 1, ..., d1. Problem (14) can be
equivalently expressed as
min
xi,i=1,...,d1
d1∑
i=1
exi
σ2i
s.t.
d1∑
i=1
xi = R
− x , −[x1, x2, ..., xd1 ]
T  0
d1∑
i=1
exi
σ2i
≤ P +
d1∑
i=1
1
σ2i
(15)
It’s easy to verify that the power allocation minimum problem
above is convex with respect to {xi}d1i=1.
However, an intractable problem the power allocation min-
imum design may incur is that, the target rate could be
unreachable under the total power constraint. To tackle it,
let us consider a relaxed power allocation minimum problem
where the total power constraint is dropped. By doing so,
if the solution of the relaxed power allocation minimum
problem does not satisfy the total power constraint, then
more dimensions will be allocated to the information signal.
Particularly, if the target rate is still unreachable when all the
power has been allocated to the information signal, we will
break off the link directly.
To solve the relaxed power allocation minimum problem,
we consider the following Lagrangian of it,
L(x, λ, ν) =
d1∑
i=1
exi
σ2i
− λTx+ ν(
d1∑
i=1
xi −R) (16)
where λ and ν are the Lagrange multipliers associated with
the constraint x  0 and
d1∑
i=1
xi = R, respectively. By Slater’s
condition [16], the strong duality holds true for the relaxed
power allocation minimum problem. Then the optimal x can
be obtained from the KKT conditions as below.
∂
d1∑
i=1
exi
σ2
i
∂xi
−
∂λTx
∂xi
+
∂v(
d1∑
i=1
xi −R)
∂xi
= 0 (17)
d1∑
i=1
xi −R = 0 (18)
λi ≥ 0 (19)
−λixi = 0 (20)
which yields
exi
σ2i
+ v = λi (21)
By (18)-(21), we consider the following two cases to solve the
optimal Pi.
• λi > 0 and xi = 0⇒ λi = 1σ2
i
+ν > 0⇒ ln(−vσ2i ) < 0
• λi = 0 and xi ≥ 0⇒ xi = ln(−vσ2i ) ≥ 0
It can be extracted from the two above cases that
xi
opt = max(0, ln(−vσ2i ))⇒ P
opt
i = max(0,−v −
1
σ2i
)
(22)
The optimal ν can be solved from (18) in the similar way as
conventional water-filling algorithm. The overall procedures
proposed for the unknown ECSI case have been summarized
in Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1 The optimal strategy for Alice without ECSI
1: Initialize the target data rate R, the number of Eve’s
antennas NE , the total power budget P .
2: Compute the singular value decomposition of H˜ba.
3: Compute d1 = min(NA − NE , c), d2 = NA − d1, then
determine Wu,Wz according to the tactics above (12).
4: Obtain Piopt and ρ by Piopt = max(0,−v − 1σ2
i
) and
ρ = (
d1∑
i=1
Pi)/P , respectively.
5: while ρ > 1
6: d1 = d1 + 1, d2 = d2 − 1, renew Wu and Wz by the
tactics above (12).
7: Recompute Piopt and ρ.
8: end while
9: if ρ > 1
10: Break off the link, and Rb = 0.
11: else
12: Output Piopt,ρ.
13: end if
In particular, it should be reminded that for the case of
unknown Ne, one can start by initializing d1 = 1. The secrecy
rate obtained from Algorithm 1 is given by
Rs =
{
R− ln |I+Φ| if R is achievable
0 otherwise
(23)
where Φ =
(
I+HeaWQzW
HHHea
)−1
HeaVQuV
HHHea, in
which Qz and Qu are given by (11), and Qu’s diagonal
elements are composed of
{
P opti
}d1
i=1
.
B. Statistical ECSI at Alice
When only the statistical ECSI is available to Alice, a
general approach is to consider the ergodic secrecy rate max-
imization (ESRM) problem. However, the problem of ERSM
is challenging for the barriers of solving the optimization
problem. Alternatively, one can choose to concentrate on
maximizing the lower bound of ergodic secrecy rate. In [11],
this problem has been derived by Yan Zhu et.al. However,
the iterative algorithm proposed in [11] are unpractical and
inefficient for its high complexity to compute the lower bound.
Instead, in this subsection, we put forward an alternative
solution to tackle the case of statistical ECSI.
Consider that Alice has an access to the statistical ECSI, we
employed a stochastic simulation method. Specifically, some
simulated channel between Alice and Eve can be randomly
generated based on the distribution of Hea. The key idea
is that, from the characteristics of Gaussian distribution, the
simulated channels will assemble in a restricted interval with
high probability. Hence, the estimation error will also be
restricted in an acceptable scope. And then, the ergodic secrecy
capacity can be approximated as the average secrecy capacity
of the simulated channels. To this end, a great number of
simulated channels are expected to generate to reduce the
average error. According to our later numerical results, we
can attain a secrecy performance identical to [11] within five
channel trials.
AN is assumed to be transmitted to degrade Eve’s re-
ception. We number the simulated channels as Hˆea(i), i =
1, 2, ..., Nsim, Nsim denotes the total number of simulated
channels. Similarly to the tactics for unknown ECSI, the
precoding matrix Wu is assumed to be composed of the right
singular vectors corresponding to the r largest singular values
of H˜ba. The AN shaping matrix Wz is composed of the
remaining NA − r right singular vectors of H˜ba. We suppose
the power distribution ratio between information and AN is
denoted as ρ yet. Then the secrecy rate for ith simulated
channel is given by (i = 1, 2, ..., Nsim)
Rˆs(r, ρ, i) = ln
∣∣I+HbaVQuVHHHba∣∣− ln
∣∣∣I+ Φˆ(i)
∣∣∣ (24)
where
Φˆ(i) =
(
I+HeaWQzW
HHHea
)−1
Hˆea(i)VQuV
HHˆHea(i),
and Qu and Qz can be expressed by
Qu = ρP · waterfilling(ρ, r),Qz =
(1 − ρ)P
NA − r
I (25)
in which the optimal power allocation matrix for the infor-
mation symbols is obtained via the water-filling algorithm.
The global suboptimal ρ∗ and r∗ are thereby attained by
maximizing the average secrecy capacity of the simulated
channels. The overall procedures for the statistical ECSI case
have been summarized in Algorithm 2.
The search for ρ∗ can be implemented by adopting the
one dimension search algorithms, such as, golden section
search and bisection search. The search for r∗ can be simply
completed via exhaustive search method. The later numerical
results in section V indicate that the total complexity of the
above procedures is much less than that in [11].
C. Full ECSI at Alice
When Alice gets an access to full ECSI, the SRM design
is reformulated as
R∗s = max ln
∣∣∣I+ H˜baQaH˜Hba
∣∣∣− ln
∣∣∣I+HeaQaHeaH
∣∣∣
s.t. Tr(Qa) ≤ P
(26)
To solve (26), the AO algorithm proposed by Qiang Li in [5]
is utilized in our paper. Alternatively, one can adopt the GSVD
algorithm proposed in [6] to deal with (26). The results of AO
algorithm and GSVD algorithm will be presented in section
V.
Algorithm 2 The optimal strategy for Alice with statistical
ECSI
1: Initialize the number of Eve’s antennas NE , the total
power budget P , the simulation number Nsim, the number
of nonzero singular value of H˜ba c.
2: Generate Nsim simulated channel matrices according to
the distribution of Hea.
3: ρ∗= arg max
ρ∈[0,1]
(
Nsim∑
i=1
max
r∈Z+,1≤r≤c
Rˆs(r, ρ, i)
)
.
4: r∗= arg max
r∈Z+,1≤r≤c
(
Nsim∑
i=1
Rˆs(r, ρ
∗, i)
)
.
5: Compute the optimal power allocation matrix p,
p∗=waterfilling(ρ∗, r∗)
6: Choose Wu as the right singular vectors corresponding
to the r∗ largest singular values of H˜ba. Choose Wz as
the remaining NA − r∗ right singular vectors of H˜ba
V. NUMERICAL RESULTS
In this section, we illustrate some numerical results to
evaluate the performance gains of our proposed approaches.
The parameters are set as: NA = 6, NE = NJ = NB = 4,
the total power budget P = 10 dB. All channels follow an
i.i.d. complex Gaussian distribution with zero mean and unit
variance.
Fig. 3 shows the performance of various algorithms designed
for different levels of ECSI. We can see that better perfor-
mance is always achievable with more ECSI. Particularly, the
AO algorithm achieves the best performance among these
algorithms. For the case of unknown ECSI, as seen, the
average secrecy rate decreases significantly with the increment
of jamming power. In addition, a lower target rate, R = 4
bps/Hz, performs better than a higher target rate R = 8
bps/Hz in high jamming power region. Namely, higher target
rate means higher outage probability, thus leading to worse
performance. As R increases to 12 bps/Hz, the outage happens
when the jamming power is only 6 dB. For the case of
statistical ECSI, we compare the performance of our stochastic
simulation method with the iterative method proposed in [11].
We can find that our stochastic method even outperforms the
iterative method in low jamming power region, also performs
identically to the iterative method in high jamming power
region. As for the reason, the iterative method only aims at
maximizing the lower bound of the ergodic secrecy capacity
while the stochastic method aims at maximizing an approxi-
mate ergodic secrecy capacity. Though the stochastic method
requires myriads of simulated channels, the complexity is still
much less than the iterative method, as shown in Fig. 4.
In Fig. 4, the runtime of stochastic search method can be
14 dB less than that of iterative algorithm in average. The
notable runtime gap demonstrates the computational efficiency
of stochastic search method. However, one can foresee that the
stochastic method may be impractical when the scale of system
keeps expanding, such as, in the massive MIMO system.
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VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have studied a four-node wiretap channel
with a malicious jammer. The system model is transformed
into the transmitter-receiver-eavesdropper wiretap channel by
whitening the interference at the legitimate receiver. With
various levels of ECSI available to the transmitter, that is,
full ECSI, unknown ECSI, and statistical ECSI, different
transmission strategies are put forward to improve the secrecy
performance. When no ECSI is available, we set a target rate
for the legitimate receiver, and determine the power allocation
matrix for information symbols by an inverse water-filling
algorithm. A high target rate may encounter high outage
probability, so the setting of target rate has to be prudent.
When statistical ECSI is available, a stochastic simulation
method is adopted to avoid the high complexity of iterative
algorithm proposed in [11]. It can be seen that the stochastic
simulation method can yield the performance identical to the
iterative algorithm along with higher computational efficiency.
Finally, when full ECSI is available, AO algorithm and GSVD
algorithm, designed for conventional wiretap channel, are
modified to solve the SRM problem in our paper.
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